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Abstract. Helios is an end-to-end verifiable remote electronic voting
system which has been used for elections in academic contexts. It allows
voters to verify that their vote was cast, and included in the final tally,
as intended. User studies have shown that voters are unlikely to perform
this verification, probably due to the effortful and cumbersome man-
ual steps that are required by the system. To address this challenge, we
propose, in this paper, two improvements: the first is to ameliorate the
cumbersome nature of the verification process as much as possible. We
offer two suggestions for doing this. To accommodate voters who have no
interest in verifying, we propose a further improvement: delegation. This
will allow voters to nominate a trusted third party to perform the veri-
fication on their behalf as and when they cast their vote. Hence no extra
effort is required, and we can exploit existing trust in public institutions
to provide voters with the assurance that the voting process is indeed
honest and above board. In addition to providing end-to-end verifiability
in a less effortful manner, we provide stored as cast and tallied as stored
verifiability as well, for voters who do not wish to verify their own votes.
1 Introduction
Internet voting is a hot topic, continuing to attract interest in real world elections
and in academic research. Helios is one Internet-based voting system that has
been used in a variety of elections, primarily in academic contexts. For example,
Helios was used to elect the university president at the Université catholique de
Louvain [4], and since 2010, to elect the Board of Directors of the International
Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR), to conduct the Princeton under-
graduate student election [22], and for the Board Election of the Institute of
Public Works Engineering Australia (IPWEA).
Vote integrity in Helios implicitly relies on two assumptions. The first is that
voters will act to verify that their vote was indeed “cast as intended” and “stored
as cast”. This requires them to take deliberate action subsequent to casting their
vote. The second assumption is that the voting environment (i.e. the device such
as the smartphone or laptop used to cast the vote) is trustworthy and has not
been compromised. The latter assumption ensures that vote integrity and secrecy
are assured.
The first assumption can only hold if all voters are motivated to verify, and
able to do so. Helios verification requires voters to write down a set of characters
computed by the voting device and then to compare them manually to another
set of characters computed by a verifier. Findings from user studies on verifica-
tion in Helios suggest that voters tend not to verify their votes [28, 17, 16]. This
applies to “cast as intended” verification (“stored as cast” verification has yet
to be evaluated). Participants in these studies found the process cumbersome,
especially since they were asked to repeat it several times. (Such repetition is
considered necessary to achieve adequate security levels.)
Since verification is considered a valuable feature in guaranteeing the integrity
of the election process, we suggest two improvements. The first is to attempt to
ease the process so that voters no longer find it so arduous. We address this issue
by proposing two means for simplifying the “cast as intended” verifiability pro-
cess: (1) copy, web browser search and paste; and (2) a verification smartphone
App (which weakens the second assumption that Helios relies on with respect to
vote integrity). Moreover, we also propose a simple way to conduct the “stored as
cast” verification process which currently is similarly cumbersome (although it
differs from cast as intended verification as it only needs to be conducted once).
For both verification options, we have taken an exploratory human-centered de-
sign approach following the guidelines given by [15] in designing and integrating
these proposals into Helios.
The second is to accept that the interface might never be able to make it
trivial enough and that there will still be many voters who will not verify. We
therefore further tailor the voting process to acknowledge this reality by allowing
voters to nominate one of a number of trusted institutes to verify on their behalf.
We hope to achieve more effective security for future elections that use Helios.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: We first present the Helios
voting system in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we present our first improvement,
namely two alleviation approaches to ease the verification process. Section 5
proposes our second improvement, namely delegating verification to a trusted
party. Section 6 presents related work in the area of usability of electronic voting
and Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 Helios Voting System
Helios is an Internet-based, open source, end-to-end verifiable voting system
[3]. It provides cast as intended verifiability, since voters can check that their
actual votes are correctly encrypted. It also supports stored as cast verifiability,
where voters can check that the encrypted votes are received by, and stored at
the voting server, for tallying purposes without modification. Finally tallied as
stored verifiability is supported, where any interested parties (including voters)
can check that all stored votes have been tallied correctly. If it is confirmed that
all stored votes were properly tallied, voters can be assured that their votes were
properly tallied if they acted previously to conduct the other two verifiability
steps. Note that in Helios vote integrity, as well as vote secrecy, is only assured
under the assumption that the voting environment (the device, the browser and
the network connection) is trustworthy. As such, the ability to verify only enables
voters or observers to detect Helios system malfunction.
In order to provide “cast as intended” verifiability, Helios uses the Benaloh
Challenge [6]. “Stored as cast” verifiability is achieved using a public web bul-
letin board that acts as a voting server to store votes [3, 4]. Either verifiable
homomorphic tallying [4] or a verifiable mix net and verifiable decryption [8] are
used to provide “tallied as stored” verifiability.
The focus of our research is on the first two verification steps as these have to
be conducted by the voters themselves (if not, vote secrecy would be violated)
while “tallied as stored” verification steps can be conducted by any interested
party. Correspondingly, we also only explain these two steps in more detail. We
will start our discussion with the original Helios version and then explain the
relevant modifications proposed in [16] which we use as a basis for the research
proposed in this paper.
Voters use the Helios interface, referred to as a ballot preparation system
(BPS), to select the candidate(s) of their choice. The BPS encrypts this selec-
tion (i.e. the vote) and displays a hash value of the encrypted vote. Voters are
supposed to record the displayed hash value in order to carry out both verifi-
cation steps. Since the SHA256 hash algorithm and Base64 encoding are used,
voters currently have to record 43 characters.3
Voters can then decide to cast the encrypted votes or to verify whether the
genuine vote was indeed encrypted (which is referred to as the Benaloh Chal-
lenge). If voters decide to verify that their vote was “cast as intended”, they
interact with the independent and trustworthy ballot verifier system (BVS).
BPS confirms the candidate(s) and the randomness used for encryption by dis-
playing this information, which voters are supposed to select and copy to the
clipboard in order to paste it into the BVS. The BVS then encrypts the corre-
sponding vote and generates the hash value of this encryption. This hash value
is displayed together with the provided candidate(s). In order to complete the
“cast as intended” verification process voters need to visually compare both val-
ues to ensure that they are correct (the 43 characters of the hash value and the
candidate/s). Note that since both hash values are displayed on the same device
it is crucial that this device be trustworthy — if not, it would always display the
expected hash value, independent from what BVS computes.
Voters can repeat the “cast as intended” verification step as many times as
required and this should actually be repeated to ensure integrity. Votes that have
been verified i.e. votes for which the randomness used for encryption has been
revealed, can no longer be cast since voters could then prove how they voted if
3 It should be emphasized that SHA256 provides overwhelming integrity assurance
at the current point in time. According to Lenstra’s revised recommendations for
key length [18], a shorter hash value can be justified for this context. Assuming an
election phase of 30 days and the adversary’s financial limitations of 3 million dollars,
a hash size length of 155 bits is sufficient to provide adequate security. According to
the PGP word list [29], 155 bits could be presented by 20 words.
this vote could be cast directly. Therefore, depending on the Helios version, voters
are re-issued with an empty ballot, or the vote is automatically re-encrypted. As
the BVS is given the content of the encryption, it is recommended that voters
verify test votes (that is, not necessarily the same as the one that will be cast)
to avoid BVS being able to derive intermediate outcomes. To support this, it
helps to use the Helios version in which the voter needs to start with the empty
ballot once he/she has verified. While Helios provides verifiability, it does not
provide accountability; i.e. if people or the verification tools falsely claim that
the “cast as intended” or “stored as cast” step could not be completed, there
is no way to distinguish between the two cases: dishonest voters/tools or Helios
being untrustworthy.
If voters choose to cast the vote, either directly or after vote encryption,
they are prompted to authenticate themselves, and their encrypted votes are
then posted to the public web bulletin board together with the hash value of the
encrypted vote. To verify that the vote is “stored as cast”, voters need to check
whether the correct hash value appears on the public web bulletin board next
to the voter’s name [3], or pseudonym [4] depending on the Helios version used.
It is only necessary to check this once as the Helios security model assumes that
observers or other trusted institutes continuously make copies of the bulletin
board and would detect malicious behaviour on the part of the bulletin board
with respect to integrity. For example, detecting removal or replacement of single
votes should be trivial.
Various aspects of “cast as intended” verification were improved in [17]. This
included instructions and simplifications (in particular reducing the number of
required steps from 15 to 7). For this paper it is relevant to point out that (1) the
information necessary for the BVS is automatically transferred from the BPS
and (2) several BVS systems are provided by different trusted institutes. Voters
now only need to trust one particular institute and not rely on only one BVS.
In [17], the authors show that this approach is as secure as the original Helios
version. Note, both versions rely on the assumption that voters check that they
are on the proper voting and verification web pages. The simplified verification
procedure is depicted in Figure 1.
These simplified steps and improved interfaces were tested in a lab user
study with 34 participants [16]. The outcome was that most of the participants
were able to verify4 (after receiving instructions to do so). However, they still
complained about the required steps being too cumbersome.
Therefore we propose less cumbersome alternatives to verify that the vote is
“cast as intended” but also propose mechanisms to verify that the vote is “stored
as cast”. We focus on simple elections (n out of m candidate(s) to be selected
in one race) to simplify the explanations in the following sections.
4 The authors of [16] reported that two participants were not able to as they only went
to the web page to select a trusted institute but then went back to the ballot prepa-
ration system without actually verifying their vote. This can be fixed by disabling
the button back to the voting process until one of the institutes is selected.
Fig. 1. Improved ballot casting and verification procedure according to [17]
3 Alleviation Option 1: Copy, Search, Paste
In this section we present and discuss the processes that voters would carry
out to verify their vote using the first alternative to the previously described
verifiability steps, namely the ‘copy, search and paste’ approach.
3.1 “Cast as Intended” Verification
Using this scheme to verify whether a vote is cast as intended, voters have to:
1. COPY: copy the check-code (using Ctrl + C) to the clipboard5 which is
displayed after the vote has been encrypted (see Figure 2, step 2)6. Note,
on clicking the icon i for more information, voters would see the following
instruction: ‘Highlight the check-code with the mouse. Simultaneously press
the Control and C keys to copy it to the clipboard.’
2. SEARCH: Voters can then decide to check the encrypted vote and select
a verifiability institute, to which they will be re-directed. The interface pro-
vides several options to verify (see Figure 3): Six institutes are represented
by their corresponding logos. An option to check using the QR checker App
(outlined in the following section), and the Manual Check option, which
refers to that provided by the original Helios interfaces also appear. The
institutes7 listed here were identified in a user study for Germany, detailed
5 Remember, Helios assumes the voting platform, i.e. the voters’ device, to be trust-
worthy. Hence there is an implicit assumption that the clipboard content is indeed
equal to the displayed text.
6 The steps and shortcuts outlined here are suitable for use on a Microsoft Windows
platform. This differs from the instructions for other operating systems and plat-
forms, such as Linux, Mac OS X, iOS, and Android. The idea is that the server
detects the browser being used and displays the corresponding instructions.
7 Note that we are not implying that the any of these institutes have agreed to provide
such a service.
Fig. 2. Options to record the hash value (referred to as ‘check-code’)
in [20]. On this new web page, the institute displays the check-code and the
candidate(s) as in previous versions. In addition, it displays instructions to
compare the check-codes (using Ctrl + F and Ctrl + V) and to check the
candidate(s). If voters do not know how to proceed, the following instructions
are displayed:
(a) To open the web browser search bar, simultaneously press the Control
and F keys on the keyboard.
(b) To paste the copied check-code from the clipboard to the search bar,
simultaneously press the Control and V keys. Press the Enter button if
necessary to compare the value in the clipboard to the value displayed
below.
3. PASTE: Voters use Ctrl-V to paste. If the displayed check-code is high-
lighted and the candidate(s) is/are the one(s) selected before, voters can be
sure that the vote was properly encrypted.
This proposed amelioration approach removes the need for manual recording
and should thus ease the verification process.
3.2 “Stored as Cast” Verification
In order to confirm that the check-code has been stored correctly on the public
web bulletin board, voters have to visit the corresponding web page and check
this using the same copy, search and paste approach. They have to confirm
Fig. 3. Checking options available to voters - voters select the QR logo
whether the check-code appearing next to their voter ID or pseudonym is high-
lighted. Note that access to the public web bulletin board is provided once voters
have been successfully authenticated, and their vote has been stored. Since the
check-code is already in the clipboard it is possible for voters to carry out the
second action independent of the first verification step. Again, as compared to
previous versions, no manual comparison of the original hash value and the one
displayed next to the voters’ ID or pseudonym is necessary.
3.3 Reflection & User Testing
While it is obvious that this approach is less cumbersome, we wanted to de-
termine whether voters would actually be able to conduct the necessary steps.
We conducted a small user study including only participants who indicated that
they would cast their vote over the Internet to ensure that we had a represen-
tative sample in the context of Internet voting. Prior to beginning the study,
participants were briefly given context information, explaining how the system
operated, and how to verify their votes. Twenty-eight female and 16 male par-
ticipants took part in the study, with an estimated average age of 26 years. We
asked all participants to use the copy, search and paste technique.
Thirty-seven out of the 44 participants were able to copy the hash value into
the clipboard on their computer without further instructions. Thirty-five of these
also correctly identified the hash value from the list without further instructions.
After further instructions 86.4% of participants were able to carry out the copy,
search and paste actions on the web browser. However, the results are admittedly
less than perfect and show that we cannot rely solely on this approach. Extra
support has to be provided for voters who can then revert to the manual process.
Hence we still have to retain and facilitate a manual verification process (see
Figure 2, step 1). To assist voters, several fields designed to hold these check-
codes can be provided with the election material that is sent to voters, along
with their voting credentials.
4 Alleviation Option 2: QR Codes & Smartphone App
In this section, we describe the processes that voters would engage in to verify
that their votes were cast as intended and stored as cast by using a smartphone
App8. A corresponding App would be developed by several trusted institutes.
Voters decide which institute to trust and then download the App from that
institute. The very sceptical could download Apps from several institutes, and
use all of them to verify. Note, voters with a background in Computer Science
can optionally develop their own App. The App approach, similar to the copy,
search and paste approach, also avoids manual recording and visual comparison,
making verification less cumbersome.
4.1 “Cast as Intended” Verification
To provide cast as intended verifiability, the ballot preparation system will dis-
play a QR code representing the check-code in addition to the human readable
value (see Figure 2). Voters will scan the QR code using the App. The App’s
interface will display the scanned check-code (see Figure 4 for the corresponding
App interface). Voters, on deciding to verify their votes, select the option ‘Check
Encrypted Vote’ on the Helios interface (see Figure 2). Voters then select the QR
checker App option (see Figure 3 for a corresponding interface). A second QR
code is displayed. Note that while this QR code could be displayed on the same
web page as the checking options (Figure 3), we required users to deliberately
choose the option. The problem with allowing direct casting was uncovered by
[16] who reported that some voters did not know how to proceed when they were
on the web page providing the options. Some thought that they had already ver-
ified and did not proceed to do so. We thus opted to disable the ‘Continue with
Voting’ button until at least one of the options on the web page had been chosen
by voters and a separate window opened. When voters return to this first page,
the ‘Continue with Voting’ button is enabled.
Using the App interface, voters elect to check that their votes are correctly
encrypted. They then select the ‘Scan’ button to scan this second QR code. To
avoid confusion, the App also instructs voters on the required steps to be carried
8 Note that this obviously means that voters use one device to cast their votes and
another to verify: perhaps a laptop and smartphone or two different smartphones.
out on the Helios interface. The App then displays the result (see Figure 5):
either informing voters of a mismatch or a match in comparing the check-codes.
In case of a match, it displays the candidate(s) and prompts voters to confirm
whether this is what they marked earlier on the ballot. If voters confirm that
the vote is correct, they will be reassured that the Helios voting system acted
with integrity. The message will also recommend that they check the vote several
times before submitting a final vote. If voters indicate that there is an error they
will be directed to contact the election commission for more information on how
to proceed.
Two prominent reasons why the check-codes might not match are that either
the voter has made a mistake, such as scanning non-matching QR codes, or the
Helios system could be untrustworthy. To address the first eventuality, the App
would first instruct voters to make sure that they had scanned the correct QR
code. If voters are certain of the mismatch, they can vote from another device,
or contact the election authorities.
Fig. 4. Scanned check-
code and options for the
voter
Fig. 5. Results of the veri-
fication process
Fig. 6. Positive result that
vote is stored on the public
web bulletin board
4.2 “Stored as Cast” Verification
In order to verify that votes are stored as cast, after scanning the first QR code
(shown in Figure 2), voters can opt to check the public web bulletin board.
Voters select the option ‘Check if vote is on the election board’ (see Figure
4). To prevent voters from proceeding in error, they are prompted to indicate
whether they have submitted their vote or not. If they indicate that they have
not yet done so, they are instructed to do so before proceeding. Once voters
have submitted their vote, (or if they indicate that they have done so), the App
checks the public web bulletin board by sending a query containing the received
check-code. It then displays a message confirming whether the check-code was
successfully stored on the public web bulletin board (see Figure 6). Given that
Helios assumes that the public web bulletin board is continuously monitored by
multiple parties, voters only have to check once.
4.3 Reflection
We anticipate that this solution will be acceptable to voters. Smartphones had
a 51% penetration rate in Germany9 in December 2012 [2] and during 2012 over
1.7 million smartphone Apps were downloaded in Germany [1]. These numbers
suggest that this verification solution is likely to be accepted by smartphone
owners. Initial research suggests that smartphone owners who would be willing
to vote over the Internet would verify their votes given an appropriate motivat-
ing message [19]. We did not carry out a user study to test the usability of the
QR code based App since it is very simple and we already know that people are
able to scan and use QR codes very successfully, as reported in various contexts
including travel information [9], libraries [5] and consumer communication [12].
Hence we expect this application not to present users with any particular chal-
lenges. This will be increasingly true as the younger technically adept generation
ages and reaches voting age.
Finally, the App weakens the need for the assumptions that Helios and the
previous amelioration option rely on, since voters now no longer need to trust
the voting platform or the App, with respect to integrity. The multiple Apps,
developed by different trusted institutes, will be bound to reveal any deception
that would have been harder to detect using the previous mechanism. We ac-
knowledge that not all voters own smartphones therefore, to ensure inclusivity,
other verification mechanisms that do not require extra devices will have to be
retained.
5 Delegating Verification to a Nominated Party
The arduous nature of the “write down and manually compare” process in Helios
is addressed by the amelioration proposals we presented in the previous two
sections. If the first two proposed options are integrated in future elections, it
should make the “cast as intended” and the “stored as cast” verification process
in Helios more efficient. Yet the element of effort undoubtedly remains, and
humans are, unfortunately, effort misers.
5.1 Proposal to Extend the Process
It is difficult to propose further simplifications while retaining the existing pro-
cess of (1) selecting the candidates, (2) verifying with one or more smartphone
Apps or web services from trustworthy institutes, (3) casting a vote and (4) ver-
ifying with one or several smartphone Apps or trustworthy web services. Given
9 Where this research was carried out.
that a significant number of voters will not make the effort to verify, we propose
re-thinking the vote casting/verification process.
In the following, we focus on voters who would not verify their votes, while
verification measures of the previous sections remain unchanged. We propose
changing the voting protocol in the following way: The various institutes will
provide web clients to allow voters to cast their votes directly. Hence, voters are
provided with several voting URLs in the election invitation letter — one for
each of the trustworthy institutes participating in the election. After deciding
whom to trust, voters use the vote casting web client provided by that trusted
institute. Voters cast a vote over the trusted web client and the institute takes
care of the remaining verifiability steps. Throughout the vote casting process, the
verification part would be less prominent as indicated in Figure 7. The institutes
would verify that all votes cast using their own web service are stored correctly,
i.e., they are “stored as cast”. In addition, they would still — as in the original
Helios as well as in our improved versions — be able to verify that all stored
votes were properly tallied. We thus promote the idea of nomination, or indeed
delegation. Note that delegation is a well-known and widely-used process [13].
An overview of the Helios variation, with nomination, is shown in Figure 8.
Fig. 7. Revised vote casting interface
Fig. 8. Helios voting with nomination
5.2 Reflection
For voters benefiting from the amelioration, the fact that someone else is also
verifying does not reduce security based on the vote casting / verification pro-
cesses from [17]. For those voters not verifying their votes, integrity assurance
is improved with the delegation approach because it is not possible for all votes
to be manipulated by a single web client. Rather, one “bad” web client could
manipulate only a subset of all the votes. On the other hand, distributing trust
among several institutes does not address the issue of malicious voting environ-
ments. If the voting environment is compromised, integrity violations cannot be
detected by any trusted institute.
6 Related Work
We will review two types of related work: (1) research aiming to improve Helios
from a technical perspective and (2) human-centered research on verification.
Since Helios was introduced, a number of technical improvements have been
proposed. Only two are of interest as they go on to propose implementations of
their work. Cortier et al. [11] present an open-source variant of Helios providing
distributed key generation. The authors do not focus on improvements regarding
voter interaction with the system. Tsoukalas et al. [27] present Zeus, a verifiable
voting and counting system based on Helios. The verifying process is modified
such that the voter can decide how the vote should be handled once it leaves
the voting platform. If voters submit so-called audit codes, generated by the
voting server and sent to them via a secondary channel, they indicate that these
submitted votes should be audited and not counted. The authors however point
out that no voters in the elections run with Zeus used the audit feature. In our
work we additionally propose a solution for voters who may not take up the
verification opportunity.
Verifiability has been studied in various contexts from a human perspective
while most often in the context of (plain text) voter verifiable paper audit trails
(VV-PATs) in a poll site election setting; e.g. Cohen [10] and later on Selker et
al.10 Selker et al. [25] showed that people are unlikely to detect manipulations
in the paper audit trails. Similar conclusions were drawn by Herrnson et al.
[14] based on the times participants spend examining the printouts. Recently,
Budurushi et al. [7] reported a promising finding. The authors found that the
number of voters verifying plain text VV-PATs increases significantly, if voters
are confronted with pre-printed “just-in-time” verification instructions. Besides
plain text VV-PATs, verification has also been studied from a human perspective
in the context of cryptographic verifiability. More precisely, it has been studied
in the context of the Prêt à Voter [24] and Scantegrity [26] electronic voting
systems. Both groups show that voters are not very likely to understand the
concepts behind cryptographic verifiability. In [24], participants stated that they
would be unlikely to verify their votes in an election. These results are not too
surprising given the fact that, according to [21], most voters have a trust model
rather than a verification model in mind when it comes to elections. Driven
by these findings, Olembo et al. [19] studied how voters could be motivated to
verify by different messages and instructions in different situations. Olembo et
al. tested the impact of three messages based on risk, norms and analogies on
intention to verify. The authors explain that there was no significant impact
on intention to verify. This warrants further investigation into the nomination
option as it seems much more closely aligned with the voter’s electronic voting
mental models.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a number of proposals to improve the usability of the verifi-
cation process in the Helios voting system. While the first two proposals actually
improve the usability of the verification process by advancing two new options to
verify, namely the copy, search, and paste approach and the QR code checking,
the third option adds the opportunity to nominate trusted institutions to verify
on voters’ behalf. This third option is a departure from earlier research on ver-
ification. It is motivated by the realization that security researchers and voters
have different mental models with respect to the verifiability of electronic voting
systems. Researchers consider verifiability of electronic voting systems essential,
because, in contrast to traditional voting, electronic voting builds upon insecure
technology such as computers and the Internet. In some countries verifiability
is required by law, which justifies the attention being paid to this aspect by
electronic voting researchers. Voters, however, seem to have a different perspec-
tive. According to [21], most voters have a trust model rather than a verification
model in mind when it comes to elections. Moreover, verifiability may make very
little sense to voters in economic terms: it carries a cost but delivers very little
personal benefit. Indeed, if the voters uncover fraud it will cost them even more
effort to report it and to follow up to ensure that the case is investigated. At the
10 We are aware of the problems regarding Selker et al.’s study design identified by
Quesenbery et al. [23]. We mention it here as the trend not to verify printouts
remains.
end of the day voters may conclude that they would rather not know, than have
to expend effort based on certain knowledge of fraud. We thus concluded that it
was worth integrating all three options into Helios. As such, the answer to the
question posed in the title “Helios Verification: To Alleviate, or to Nominate:
Is That The Question, Or Shall We Have Both?” is: We need both.
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